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MIRANDA IN PRISON:
THE DILEMMA OF PRISON DISCIPLINE AND
INTRAMURAL CRIME
WILLIAM BENNETT TURNER

*

and

ALICE DANIEL t

"Mirandais part of a prisoner's bill of rights."
William 0. Douglas'

U

ntil very recently a prisoner enjoyed virtually no Bill of Rights
protection against arbitrary or undeserved in-prison disciplinary punishment. A few courts had decided that barbarous
conditions of solitary confinement violated the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.2 But only within
the past two years have courts begun to examine the extent to
which due process safeguards must be observed in internal prison
disciplinary proceedings. The event triggering judicial review in
most of these cases has been the imposition of a serious disciplinary punishment like solitary confinement, transfer to maximum
security or forfeiture of statutory "good time." 3 In several cases
the courts have reasoned that such serious consequences to the
prisoner-substantially prolonging his incarceration or rendering
it more onerous-require at least "rudimentary" due process pro* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., San Francisco, California. B.S., Northwestern University, 1959; J.D., Harvard University, 1963.
t Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., San Francisco, California. B.A., Boston University, 1958; LL.B., Columbia University, 1963.
The authors are grateful to their colleague Stanley A. Bass for his helpful suggestions in the preparation of this article.
1. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller. 92 S. Ct. 35 (1971) (dissenting from denial of temporary restraining order).
2. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Hancock v. Avery, 301
'. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Barnes
v. Hocker, No. R-2071 (D. Nev., Sept. 3, 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674
(N.D. Cal. 1966).
3. Almost all prison systems have a statutory scheme for reducing a prisoner's actual
time served or advancing parole consideration by granting time off for good behavior.
For typical "good time" statutes, see N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 230(4) (McKinney 1968); TEx.
REv. Civ. STATS. ANN. art. 61841 (West 1970); 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970). The purpose of
such statutes is to provide an incentive for prisoners to behave in a manner acceptable
to prison officials. See generally Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A
Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473, 496-99 (1971).
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tections to guard against error or arbitrariness in the disciplinary
process.4
Some of the recent cases have spelled out specifically what
due process requires by way of notice and a fair hearing., The
Second Circuit's important but very conservative decision in Sostre v. McGinnis 6 declined to lay down a definitive code of disciplinary procedure but did state that due process requires at
least that the accused prisoner be given notice and "a reasonable
opportunity to explain his actions" to the authorities. 7 Affirmation of the prisoner's right to be heard in his own defense is a
common denominator of all the recent due process cases. That is,
even courts that stop short of requiring counsel, confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses and the right to call witnesses
recognize the prisoner's constitutional right to appear and be
heard.
What all but one 8 of the cases have overlooked, however, is
the effect of Mirandav. Arizona 9 on prison disciplinary proceedings. It seems clear that the Miranda decision requires drastic
4. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-2357, 9th Cir., Aug. 30,
1971; Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F.
Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), reo'd
in part, - F.2d -, No. 35572 (2d Cir., Mar. 16, 1972); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp.
1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); McCray v. State, - A.2d -, 40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, Nov. 11, 1971); cf. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Morris
v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.RI. 1970). The cases have generally followed the procedural due process analysis of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). For the thoughtful
views of a California Supreme Court Justice on prisoners' procedural guarantees, see Tobriner, Due Process Behind Prison Walls, THE NATION, Oct. 18, 1971, at 367.
Apart from procedural protections, several courts have recently held that due process
requires the promulgation of substantive rules of conduct to be communicated to the
inmate population. See Landman v. Royster, supra; Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp.
1123 (E.D. La. 1971); Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); McCray v.
State, supra. Thus, prisoners are entitled to fair warning of the kind of conduct that will
risk severe disciplinary punishment.
5. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-2357, 9th Cir., Aug. 30,
1971; McCray v. State, - A.2d -, 40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery County,
Nov. 11, 1971); cf. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971) (regulations voluntarily adopted); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) (consent decree).
6. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
7. 442 F.2d at 198.
8. The exception is Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
appeal docketed, No. 71-2357, 9th Cir., Aug. 30, 1971, which is discussed in detail below.
The authors are counsel for the prisoners in Clutchette, but hope that this article does
not substitute advocacy for analysis.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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modifications of the usual disciplinary procedures. This article
explores the effect of Miranda and the possible modifications to
deal with the problem presented.
The problem is that many disciplinary offenses also constitute crimes. Prison disciplinary committees frequently adjudicate
charges of assault (on another inmate or on a guard), possession
of weapons, rioting, gambling, possession or sale of drugs, escape,
etc., all of which may be criminally prosecuted. All prison systems have rules prohibiting inmates from engaging in such behavior, and some even state that any act punishable as a crime in
the free world is also a violation of prison rules.10 On the basis of
their findings, prison disciplinary committees often refer cases to
the district attorney for prosecution.
In some states, when the in-prison offense constitutes a crime,
the accused prisoner is advised by the disciplinary committee of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an attorney
present during interrogation."- He is specifically advised that anything he says "can and will" be used against him in a court of law.
However, if the prisoner then requests an attorney, he is told
that he cannot see one until the district attorney interviews him.
If he exercises his right to remain silent the committee nevertheless proceeds to adjudicate the disciplinary infraction, relying
solely on written reports or the "prosecution's" evidence against
him.
This was the procedure followed at San Quentin until the
decision in Clutchette v. Procunier. - The Clutchette decision was
the first to consider the effect of Miranda on prison disciplinary
proceedings. The court found that "the trap is unavoidable" for
the prisoner-warned that anything he says may be used against
him in a criminal prosecution, the prisoner "definitionally prejudices himself" by either (1) remaining silent, thus sacrificing
any defense or explanation of the disciplinary charge and risking
10. See, e.g., TEx. DEP'T OF CoRREc., RULES AND REGULATIONS 10 (1968).
11. The Miranda warnings are required in California prisons by the decision in
People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 861, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965); in New York
prisons by an Attorney General opinion,, N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. Op. 409/70, Feb. 11, 1971,
reported in 8 CP.It. L. REP. 2486 (1971); and in federal prisons by Federal Bureau of
Prisons Policy Statement No. 2001.1 (Feb. 19, 1968).
12. 828 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-2857, 9th Cir., Aug.
30, 1971.
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severe punishment, or (2) speaking in his own defense and risking self-incrimination in a later criminal prosecution.

The court in Clutchette invalidated this procedure, pointing
out that it presents even more serious constitutional infirmities
than those in Miranda.As will be seen, the court's conclusion was
plainly sound.
The Supreme Court in Miranda declared that when an individual is in governmental custody and "is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized." 13 It

is well-established that questioning an imprisoned suspect is custodial interrogation under Miranda,4 even when the interrogation is not intended to elicit evidence for criminal prosecution
and the person questioned is in custody for an entirely separate

offense:
These differences are too minor and shadowy to justify a departure
from the well-considered conclusions of Miranda with reference to
warnings to be given to a person held in custody....
There is no substance to such a distinction, and in effect it
goes against the whole purpose of the Miranda decision which was
designed to give meaningful protection to Fifth Amendment

rights.' 5

13. 384 U.S. at 478. Even if the Miranda decision were limited or substantially qualified, and even if the exclusionary rule announced in Miranda were abandoned, the rights
protected thereby would remain, 384 U.S. at 442; and the need for the procedural safeguards discussed herein would be even greater than at present. As the court noted in
Clutchette, the procedure condemned there suffers from even more serious constitutional
infirmities than those involved in Miranda.328 F. Supp. at 777.
14. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Blyden v. Hogan, 320 F. Supp.
513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967); People v. Dorado, 62
Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965). In Inmates of the Attica Correctional
Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971), the court denied injunctive relief to
prisoners subject to interrogation by the attorney general's office in the aftermath of the
Attica rebellion, but the court did not question the applicability of Miranda to the interrogations. Indeed, the court noted that the attorney general's staff was alert to giving the
Miranda warnings and that many prisoners had in fact consulted with counsel. Accordingly, the court found no need for an injunction against interrogation except after consultation with counsel and only in the presence of counsel.
15. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968). See also Blyden v. Hogan, 320
F. Supp. 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Nor should it make any difference that the prison
disciplinary offense charged is not itself a crime; if it is closely related to criminal conduct
and the interrogation at the disciplinary hearing may elicit evidence of a crime, the
Miranda protections should apply. See the opinion of Waterman, J., dissenting from the
panel's decision in Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730, 733-37 (2d Cir. 1971). In Rodriguez the disciplinary charge was possession of contraband (apparently not a crime), but
the questioning concerned how the prisoner acquired the contraband-if the prisoner had
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It seems plain, therefore, that the Clutchette court was correct in holding that the Miranda protections must be observed in
disciplinary proceedings.10 The prison officials are thus required
to give the Miranda warnings and advise the accused prisoner of
his right to remain silent and to have an attorney. But unless
prison officials are willing to go further and actually implement
the Miranda rights, the problem identified in Clutchette arises.
The prisoner may give up his right to remain silent in order to
defend himself, thus allowing the disciplinary committee to proceed; but the "voluntariness" of a statement made in such circumstances is questionable. The threat of punishment by solitary
confinement or loss of statutory good time may operate to coerce
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. On the other hand, the
prisoner who chooses to remain silent is left "stripped of any
possible means of defense." 17 Imposition of serious disciplinary
sanctions at that point makes the price of silence "costly" and
impermissibly penalizes the prisoner's exercise of fifth amendment
18
rights.
not refused to "talk" he might have implicated himself in a criminal conspiracy to smuggle contraband into the prison. The panel's decision denying the prisoner relief was
overturned and the decision of the district court granting relief on other grounds was
affirmed by the Second Circuit en banc. - F.2d -, No. 34567 (2d Cir., Jan. 25, 1972).
16. See also authorities cited in supra note 11. The decision in Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971), is not to the contrary. See
supra note 14. In Attica there was no threat of any disciplinary action at all-the warden
testified that there would be no discipline imposed-and the court's denial of injunctive
relief was "without prejudice" to the prisoners' due process rights "in any disciplinary
proceeding that might be instituted against them." 453 F.2d at 22.
17. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. at 779.
18. See Spevack v. Klein, 885 U.S. 511, 515 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.s.
498 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d
658, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 892 U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitationmen Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 892 U.S. 280 (1968); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
Many cases have held that serious disciplinary sanctions inflict "grievous loss" on the
prisoner. See authorities cited in supra note 4. Even the retrogressive decision in Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), conceded that punitive segregation was "onerous
indeed" and pointed out the continuing punishment caused by deprivation of good time.
442 F.2d at 196, 204. There can be no doubt, therefore, as to the costliness of standing
mute and defenseless before a prison disciplinary committee.
The decision in Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 188 (1971), does not undermine the
conclusion reached in Clutchette. The Supreme Court there held that a separate penalty
trial was not constitutionally mandated in capital cases, despite the "tension" between
the accused's right to remain silent on the issue of guilt and his right to present mitigating testimony on the issue of punishment. But in the prison disciplinary situation the
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Thus the disciplinary committee cannot, using the typical
prison procedures, impose punishment. However, prison authorities may consider the prisoner's alleged misconduct too serious to
permit him to remain in the general prison population. In other
words, they may take the position that security requires imposition of discipline without awaiting the outcome of criminal prosecution. If so, they may conduct a disciplinary proceeding, but
only if-as the court in Clutchette held-the accused is furnished
with counsel and given the right to cross-examine and call witnesses. Counsel must be furnished not only to comply with rudimentary standards of due process, 9 but because Miranda requires
it. Cross-examination and the right to call witnesses are required
not only to provide due process protection, 2 but also because the
accused who exercises his privilege to remain silent is defenseless
without these rights and may then succumb to the obvious pressure to waive the privilege. In short, the demands of Miranda and
elementary due process require drastic modifications in prison
disciplinary proceedings.
The solution required by the Clutchette decision is not
the only possible means of resolving the constitutional difficulty.
Roughly in order of diminishing utility to the accused prisoner
and of decreasing justification in terms of public policy and constitutional doctrine, the following proposals might be considered:
(1) no disciplinary punishment at all would be imposed and the
dilemma does not arise from a "tension" between two rights. It arises from the prisons'
unwillingness to implement the admittedly applicable right announced in Miranda "to
have counsel present during any questioning." 384 U.S. at 470. Moreover, the accuscd
in a capital case is not "stripped of any possible means of defense" even if he decides
not to take the witness stand. He enjoys the presumption of innocence (which is unknown
at prison disciplinary hearings) and is protected by the reasonable doubt requirement.
He has a right to decision by an impartial jury; he is represented by an attorney who
can cross-examine and call witnesses and argue mitigating circumstances to the jury. See
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. at 778-79 nn.6 & 7. The silent prisoner accused of
crime in a disciplinary proceeding lacks all these protections.
19. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
'The right to counsel has been held so essential to "the very integrity of the fact-finding
process" as to require retroactive application in the criminal procedure context. See
McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
20. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); ef. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in criminal proceedings has been held
so essential to "the integrity of the fact-finding process" as to require retroactive application. See Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969); cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
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state would rely on criminal prosecdtion as the only sanction;
(2) as in Clutchette, the accused prisoner would be given an Attorney with the right to cross-examine and call witnesses at the
disciplinary hearing; (3) a statutory or judicially implied immunity would be provided, permitting the inmate to defend himself in the disciplinary proceeding without the risk that his
statements could be used against him in the criminal prosecution; (4) the officials could decline, as a matter of policy, to give
the Miranda warnings, thus rendering inadmissible in court whatever statements the prisoner might make in the disciplinary proceeding; and (5) the disciplinary proceeding would be postponed
until after the criminal prosecution had concluded. We consider
each of these proposals below.
1. No Disciplinary Punishment. While this solution satisfactorily resolves the dilemma from the prisoner's point of view,2
it is likely to be unacceptable to prison officials.22 This is especially true where the offense involves assault on a guard or on
another inmate. In such cases, prison officials may fear that further violence will occur if the accused prisoner is permitted to
circulate in the general prison population. They reason that failing to impose visible punishment on a prisoner charged with
assaulting a guard will create the impression that "he got away
with it." If he is charged with assaulting another inmate, the officials may fear reprisals by the other inmate or his friends. Accordingly, in many cases officials feel that some type of disciplinary
lockup is required to maintain order in the prison.
Aside from the reluctance of prison officials to forego disciplinary punishment where serious offenses are involved, it is
unlikely that a court would enjoin officials from imposing administrative controls and require them to rely on criminal prosecution
alone. Therefore, despite its appeal to the accused prisoner and
satisfactory resolution of the constitutional dilemma, this solution is unlikely to be adopted by prison officials.
21. Obviously, substitution of a criminal prosecution which might not otherwise
have been undertaken does not improve the inmate's situation. But where the crime
would have been prosecuted anyway, not having to face prison disciplinary proceedings
is a clear gain.
22. But see Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1971), where the officials unequivocally disclaimed any interest in imposing disciplinary or administrative sanctions on Attica prisoners who were suspected of criminal
acts during the September, 1971, uprising.
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2. The Clutchette Solution. The court in Clutchette resolved the Miranda-due process dilemma by holding that if a
disciplinary proceeding is held when the offense may also be prosecuted as a crime, the accused inmate must be given an attorney
to help him make the choice between exercising his fifth amendment privilege and waiving it to speak in his own defense. Further, the court held that due process requires that the inmate be
given the right to cross-examine and call witnesses. Otherwise, if
he remained silent, he would be defenseless to the charge.
This solution has the advantage of permitting the inmate to
protect against the risk of self-incrimination without forfeiting a
defense to the disciplinary charge. With the aid of an attorney and
the right to cross-examine and call witnesses, the inmate may be
able to show that he is not guilty or that mitigating circumstances
should preclude either disciplinary punishment or criminal referral. This solution does not eliminate the risk of double punishment,' but its other advantages to the accused prisoner are clear.
On the other hand, prison officials will undoubtedly resist
this solution because it requires the presence of lawyers at internal prison hearings. The officials are likely to contend that their
presence would interfere with the smooth functioning of the
prison disciplinary system. In addition, they may claim that recruiting attorneys to serve in disciplinary proceedings will be
unduly difficult-especially at prisons remote from urban centers.
But Miranda obligates the state to appoint attorneys for indigent
prisoners who want them,2 4 and in any event this should not be
prohibitively expensive because the state must furnish counsel
only where felony conduct is involved. 5
23. The court in Clutchette suggested that there might be a double jeopardy problem if the prisoner is twice subjected to punishment for the same act, once in disciplinary
proceedings and once in a criminal prosecution. 328 F. Supp. at 778. It has been held,
however, that prison administrative punishment, coupled with criminal prosecution, does
not raise a double jeopardy question. See United States v. Cordova, 414 F.2d 277 (5th
Cir. 1969). But as Clutchette indicates, the soundness of this position seems questionable
when a punishment like loss of statutory "good time" is imposed in addition to criminal
prosecution. In such a case, where the in-prison punishment goes beyond administrative
control and operates in substance like a new sentence to prison (because it prolongs the
prisoner's overall term of incarceration), the policy underlying the double jeopardy clause
should be given effect. If the criminal prosecution (or the disciplinary punishment) were
barred by double jeopardy, of course, the problem considered in this article would not
exist because the prisoner would need to defend himself in only one forum.
24. 384 U.S. at 472-73.
25. But cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, No. 70-5015 (U.S., argued Dec. 6, 1971), involving
the right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions. It should also be noted
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The real basis for the officials' objection to the presence of
lawyers at disciplinary proceedings is their almost paranoid mistrust of lawyers who represent prisoners. Many officials oppose the
intrusion of any outsider in the prison inner sanctum, but lawyers
who represent the interests of prisoners vis-a-vis the prison administration are, in their view, particularly suspect.26 The officials also fear that attorney participation in disciplinary
proceedings would create an adversarial climate inimical to the
sound administration of discipline. They prefer to emphasize disposition rather than fact finding at disciplinary hearings. However, when criminal conduct is charged, fact finding cannot be
avoided and the presence of counsel, even acting in a non-adversarial role, is essential to the integrity of the fact-finding process.
In any event, prison officials will no doubt prefer an alternative
that does not require the presence of attorneys.
that considerations of additional expense are not an excuse for failure to respect constitutional rights. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearings required despite
fiscal and administrative burdens on the state); cf. Jones v. Metzger, - F.2d -, No. 711865 (6th Cir., Mar. 14, 1972) (budgetary and manpower changes required in jail reform
suit); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) ("Humane considerations and
constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar considerations . . . . ); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (recognition that
legislature must appropriate very substantial sums to remedy unconstitutional conditions).
Several cases have held that due process may be satisfied in the prison context by the
provision of "counsel substitute" in non-felony cases. See authorities cited in supra note 5.
The substitute may be a staff member, a law student, or a fellow inmate. The court in
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), said that while the state need furnish no more (and could constitutionally furnish no less) than such lay representation, an
accused prisoner could also bring in a privately retained attorney.
26. One of the principal charges in California's attempt to destroy California Rural
Legal Assistance was the OEO program's allegedly improper representation of prisoners.
A special federal investigating commission found the charge "totally irresponsible and
without foundation." See Sigman, A Case for Skepticism, THE NATION, Nov. 1, 1971, at
424. California officials have also tried to blame prison violence on the activities of "revolutionary" attorneys. Id. It is not uncommon for prison officials summarily to bar prisoners' rights attorneys from entering the prison, although such action has not survived court
challenge. See, e.g., Doe v. Bell, No. C-71 310 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 19, 1971); Atencio v. King,
No. 9165 (D.N.M., Oct. 13, 1971). But see Hellerstein &:Shapiro, Prison Crisis Litigation:
Problems and Suggestions, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 643, 647 n.9 (1972). It has required court
orders in numerous cases to stop officials from interfering with prisoners' mail to attorneys
complaining of prison conditions. See, e.g., Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970);
Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th
Cir. 1964).
27. See supra note 19. Courts in varying contexts have recognized that counsel can
enhance the fairness of the proceeding without necessarily playing an inappropriate adversarial role. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 383 U.S. 218 (1967); United States ex rel.
Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
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3. Immunity. If the accused prisoner were granted immunity, permitting him to defend himself in the disciplinary proceeding without the risk that his statements could be used against
him in a later criminal prosecution, the Miranda problem would
seem to disappear. A grant of immunity would acknowledge the
inherently coercive atmosphere of the disciplinary hearing and
protect against involuntary waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. It would eliminate the need to litigate the question of voluntariness in every case. It would seemingly give the prisoner "the
full and free ability to testify in his own behalf and present his
case" before the disciplinary committee. 2 At the same time, it
would permit the state both to impose administrative controls in
prison and to protect its interest in the prosecution of crime.
However, the possibility that immunity may be granted is at
present only speculative. In the first place, we are aware of no
statutes granting immunity for the purpose of disciplining prisoners. Any immunity would have to be implied by a court which
recognized the need for a means of protecting the fifth amendment privilege. There is respectable authority for such an implied immunity. In an analogous situation the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia noted the dilemma facing a parolee
who was subjected to a parole revocation hearing based on new
criminal charges and held that "any self-incriminatory statements
made in a parole revocation hearing shall not be used affirmatively against the parolee in any subsequent criminal proceeding." 29 But in the absence of either a statute or a prior judicial
declaration of immunity within the jurisdiction, this solution is
too uncertain to be relied upon to resolve a key problem in any
disciplinary plan.
Further, granting immunity leaves open the questions
whether the prisoner is entitled to counsel and whether he may
28.

Cf. Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The danger should be

-noted, however, that even if the prisoner's statement cannot be used affirmatively against
him, it might be used for impeachment purposes in a later criminal proceeding. Cf. Harris
v. New York, 401 US. 222 (1971). This danger would be eliminated if full transactional

immunity were granted. See text accompanying notes 31-34, inIra.
29. Id. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (federal
authorities barred from using state-compelled testimony); Uniformed Sanitationmen Ass'n
v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 626-27 (2d Cir. 1970) (no need for statute to
grant use immunity); cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968) (testimony on
motion to suppress 4inadmissible at trial); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954)
(fifth amendment renders compelled testimony inadmissible).
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cross-examine or call witnesses at the disciplinary hearing. With
Miranda out of the picture, only procedural due process remains,
and the courts now disagree on whether due process mandates
these rights in the prison context.3 Without them, the prisoner's
interests are jeopardized by a substantially less reliable fact-finding process. Thus, granting immunity may leave the prisoner
much worse off in resisting disciplinary punishments.
Nor is there any guarantee that an immunity grant would
protect him from double punishment in case of criminal prosecution. That would depend on whether "use" immunity or "transactional" immunity were granted. The former would merely
exclude from evidence any statements (or the "fruits" thereof)
made by the prisoner at the disciplinary hearing.3 ' Transactional
immunity would completely bar prosecution based on the criminal transaction to which his statements refer. Whether full transactional immunity is required to protect fifth amendment
interests is currently in dispute.32 The problem is not easy: if the
Miranda aspect of the dilemma is emphasized, only use immunity
need be granted since the result is to render any statements inadmissible; but if the emphasis is on preventing compulsion to give
incriminating testimony regardless of its use, transactional immunity would be required.3 3 Transactional immunity would also
30. Compare authorities cited in supra notes 19 & 20, with Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).

31.

Although the court did not discuss the issue, it declared an implied "use" im-

munity in Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See text at supra note 29. The
court in Uniformed Sanitationmen Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 627
(2d Cir. 1970), was willing to require a grant of use immunity in the absence of an enabling
statute but questioned whether full transactional immunity could be granted by city officeis
without a statute.
32. Compare United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971), with
Uniformed Sanitationmen Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970).
Although Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), has usually been read to require a
grant of transactional immunity before a state can compel testimony (e.g., before a grand
jury), Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), barred only the use of statecompelled testimony by federal authorities. The Court almost resolved the matter in
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971), but dismissed certiorari as improvidently
granted when New York began granting transactional immunity. See Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion for an exhaustive analysis of the issue and a conclusion that transactional
immunity is constitutionally required. 400 U.S. at 562. The Court may decide the question
this term in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, No. 69-4 (U.S., argued
Jan. 11, 1972), and Kastigar v. United States, No. 70-117 (U.S., argued Jan. 11, 1972).
33. The question turns on the purpose of the fifth amendment privilege. Transactional
immunity is required in Mr. Justice Brennan's view: "The clause does not prohibit a
prosecution or conviction; it prohibits the application vel non of compulsion to an individual to force testimony that incriminates him, regardless of whether he is actually
prosecuted." Piccirillo v. New York, 400 US. 548, 564 (1971). It is true that state prison
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be required by a court taking the view that criminal prosecution
after prison disciplinary punishment is unconstitutional double
34
punishment.
4. Omission of Miranda Warnings. If an accused prisoner
were not given the required warnings at a disciplinary hearing,
any statements he made in his own defense would be inadmissible
in a later criminal trial, by virtue of the Miranda decision itself.
Prison officials might argue that the exclusionary rule adequately
protects the prisoner's rights, and thus attempt to resolve the
Miranda-due process dilemma by systematically omitting Miranda
warnings.35 Theoretically, the prisoner could then exercise his
right to speak in his own defense without fear of self-incrimination.
But closer examination shows this course to be unsatisfactory
from all points of view. The state's prosecutorial interest in preserving the admissibility of all relevant evidence would be frustrated because valid Miranda waivers could never be obtained.
Therefore, otherwise-admissible statements would often have to
be excluded. On the other hand, the prisoner would not be protected against the risk of unintentionally incriminating himself
by "volunteering" statements in his own defense.8 Their admissibility would be a perennial source of litigation. Some prisoners
would undoubtedly recognize the possibility of self-incrimination, even without Miranda warnings, and would refuse to make
any statements at the disciplinary hearing; but they would then
be left with no other means of defending themselves. And their
silence might also be unsatisfactory from the point of view of the
prison administration, which would be deprived of assurance that
officials are not affirmatively seeking a prisoner's testimony in a disciplinary proceeding and
this might serve as a distinction from the grand jury situation, but the threat of disciplinary punishment is nevertheless an obvious kind of compulsion on the prisoner to make
statements that could later incriminate him.
84. See supranote 23.

85. This practice is followed in many states today, but probably does not result from
design but rather from failure to recognize the impact of Miranda.
36. "Volunteered" statements may be outside the scope of Miranda protection, 384 U.S.
at 478. However, applying this rule to the prison situation would be unjustified. Unlike the
police station suspect, the prisoner faces serious and authorized punishment if he does not
speak in his own defense. Because the compulsion to speak is so much greater, it should be
irrelevant that a statement is not prompted by a direct question. See also supra note 28.
37. This is what the prisoner did in Haines v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972). Rather
than explain his version of the events at the disciplinary hearing, the prisoner remained
silent when accused of assault and was sentenced to solitary confinement. The Supreme
Court ruled that he was entitled to a hearing on his claim of unduly harsh punishment.
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the disciplinary problem had been appropriately resolved.
Finally, it is singularly inappropriate and probably unconstitutional for a state to adopt an official policy of deliberately disobeying clearly applicable law.3" Miranda warnings are required
because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, and their omission can hardly be justified on the ground that
it is administratively inconvenient to conduct hearings that actually implement Miranda.
5. Postponing Disciplinary Proceedings. It may be suggested that the Miranda-due process dilemma can be solved by
postponing disciplinary proceedings until the criminal case has
been disposed of. At first glance, this seems to be a sensible and
administratively feasible solution, and indeed it would be if the
accused remained at large in the prison during this period. But
most prisons would refuse to permit this. They routinely segregate criminally-accused prisoners from the general prison population until the prosecution has concluded, confining them in
conditions that are indistinguishable from punitive segregation
or maximum security. In other words, the mere accusation of
criminal conduct results in the same treatment that would follow
conviction of a serious disciplinary offense. Thus, to postpone disciplinary proceedings is to impose punishment without any hearing at all.
Prison officials may attempt to dispense with the due process
safeguards required at disciplinary proceedings by treating the
matter as a "classification" problem. Classification committees are
typically empowered to assign inmates to segregation for a wide
variety of reasons, including a general belief that the inmate is
"a menace to [himself] or others, or to property, or to the morale
of the general population." 9 In the usual classification proceed38. In Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1971), a divided court declined to enjoin interrogation of Attica prisoners where
(1) the state was conscientiously administering Miranda warnings and permitting consultation with counsel prior to questioning; (2) the interrogators were not prison staff
and the inmates were shielded from any penalty from silence; and (3) intervening in a
"pending state criminal proceeding" would have violated applicable principles governing
federal-state relations. The entire court recognized that statements taken from prisoners
without Miranda warnings would be inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, and despite
concurring Judge Lumbard's position that Miranda is just "a rule of evidence," the other
opinions made it clear that a systematic failure to observe Miranda would not be tolerated.
Cf. Blyden v. Hogan, 320 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (injunction requiring Miranda warnings before interrogation).
39. See, e.g., California Department of Corrections, Director's Rule D4205.
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ing, the inmate appears and is given an opportunity to be heard.
The committee then decides whether, in their view, segregation
is advisable. If criminal conduct is suspected, the inmate may be
given Miranda warnings, but, as in the disciplinary proceeding
condemned by Clutchette, a request for the presence of counsel
will be denied. 40
Prison officials contend that the procedural Safeguards of the
Clutchette decision are not required at classification proceedings
because it is not their function to adjudicate whether the accused
in fact committed an offense. But at least some fact finding is required to determine whether the criteria for assignment to segregation have been met.4 Moreover, it was not the adjudicatory
function of the disciplinary committee that was crucial in Clutchette. The sense of Clutchette and the other due process decisions is that where the consequences of the administrative
determination are sufficiently serious, fundamental procedural
guarantees of fairness must be observed.42 Since these decisions
specifically identified long-term segregation as a "serious" consequence, attaching a "classification" label to the committee making
the determination cannot lead to a different result.4 3
40. It is sometimes forgotten that Miranda requires more than merely reciting a litany
of warnings. The Court there flatly dedared that "[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires." 384 U.S. at 470.
41. Such proceedings in practice operate on the premise that the inmate is guilty, because it is his alleged crime that triggers the classification process in the first place.
42. See authorities cited in supra note 4.
43. In Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971), the court said that prison
officials could not be allowed to "circumvent" due process by labeling proceedings "administrative" instead of "disciplinary," and held that equal protection requires that
"prisoners who are confined to administrative segregation for the good of the institution
should be entitled to the same minimal due process that is already afforded prisoners who
are confined to segregation for disciplinary infractions." See also United States ex rel.
Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1971). In Walker, the court condemned
"protective" segregation of Attica prisoners suspected as leaders of the uprising there,
noting that even Second Circuit due process decisions required notice and some kind
of hearing when "substantial deprivations" are visited on prisoners.
Officials may also argue that due process is inapplicable by analogizing the classification
committee's segregation decision to a magistrate's decision to jail an accused pending trialwhich does not require an evidentiary hearing. This analogy is faulty. In the first place,
bail is set in open court, where the accused is entitled to representation by counsel. More
important, a judge's decision to set high bail effectively equivalent to pre-trial detention is
legally unjustified unless the court finds that a lower amount would be insufficient to ensure
the accused's appearance at trial. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). Obviously,
that consideration is inapplicable to a defendant already in prison. Where "preventive detention" as such is permitted pending trial, it is hedged with procedural safeguards including an adversary hearing to establish that the statutory criteria are met. See D.C. CoDE ANN.
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Since due process is applicable, the inmate is entitled to an
opportunity to be heard. But once again, as in the procedure condemned by Clutchette, he cannot defend himself unless he waives
his fifth amendment privilege. Thus, utilizing the prison classification committee instead of the disciplinary committee would not
solve the Miranda-due process problem. It would merely change
the stage on which the dilemma is played. The prisoner would
still be prevented from giving his own version of the alleged misconduct unless he waived the fifth amendment. He would still
face the same penalty-segregation-for exercising the privilege.
He would still be "stripped of any possible means of defense" '
and, thus, vulnerable to the coercive pressures to waive his rights.
CONCLUSION

Of the possible solutions to the dilemma of prison discipline
and intramural crime, the Clutchette approach is the most sound.
It accords full respect to the Miranda decision and does not interfere with any substantial state interest. It provides the accused
prisoner with counsel and procedural rights necessary to protect
basic interests and ensure fair fact finding, while permitting the
prison to deal promptly with disciplinary problems. Finally, by
making valid Miranda waivers possible, the procedure protects
the state's interest in criminal prosecution. Widespread adoption of
the Clutchette approach would thus satisfactorily resolve, from all
points of view, the serious problems presented by prison officials'
attempts to deal with intramural crime.
§§ 28-1321 & 1822 (Supp. IV, 1971). There is no reason to require less for the segregation of
men in prison.
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

